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The paper gives an analysis of discrepancy between organizational goals and labor’s behavior 
at a Hungarian engineering enterprise. The occasional partial or complete rejection by workers of 
enterprise goals like the increase of production, the introduction of a new incentive plan, the 
authors assume, can be traced back to the lack of multilateral and lasting compromise of 
interests, to the balance of powers within the organization, and to a set of interacting micro- 
and macrofactors of the socioeconomic environment.
1. The problem to be discussed
There is a prevailing belief in Hungarian society that, by means of the 
decentralized scheme o f the centrally planned economy introduced two 
years ago, m ost obstacles to  the growth o f industrial efficiency can be 
overcome, directly or indirectly, by differential m onetary incentives. 
For the past two years, a part o f the enterprises, profits has been used 
for differential incentive bonuses up to  80 percent o f salary for top 
management, 50 percent for middle managers, and 15 percent for wage 
earners. The considerable share in profits has seemed to  be a driving 
force for management, and managers have made manifold attem pts to 
increase the efficiency and profits o f the enterprises. They have, how­
ever, usually failed in their efforts to  get workers to contribute more to 
enterprise objectives; the obstacles to  the growth o f efficiency have 
often continued to exist on the shop floor.
* The summing up of a substantial study about labor-management and intralabor conflicts in a 
business organization of a centrally planned economy (Budapest, 1970).
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As a general rule at several enterprises labor has rejected enterprise 
goals and there has remained a constant gap between requirem ents set 
up by management and the everyday activities o f employees. The lack 
of sym pathy with m anagement’s objectives has been manifested in 
many ways: workers have resisted attem pts to  maintain strict discipline, 
they have deliberately restricted ou tpu t and performed work o f poor 
quality, etc. Many managers and economic leaders are convinced that 
this discrepancy between enterprise goals and labor’s behavior can be 
attributed to  inadequacies in m onetary incentives and to  the lack of fair 
wage differentials among workers.
Our proposition is that causal relations are no t so unambiguous and 
simple — inadequacies in wage incentives, though closely connected 
w ith difficulties in workshops, cannot be a root cause for discipline 
defects and restriction of ou tpu t since they themselves are also a sur­
face problem. The root cause for difficulties, including also the lack of 
fair wage differentials, lies in the structure o f interests and powers 
within the organization, based on certain micro- and m acrofactors of 
the social and economic environment. These factors originate from the 
present regulations set up by social and economic central agencies, and 
from the characteristics o f the overall socioeconomic system o f indus­
try that has come into existence as a result o f the development o f the 
past few decades.
To place our proposition in a sharper focus, production difficulties in 
workshops cannot be solved solely by the revision o f the incentive 
system. The solution o f present problems, including the introduction of 
efficient wage differentials, requires complex changes in the structure 
o f interests and powers within the enterprise, that is, complex modifica­
tions in the social and economic background.
2. The enterprise, its workers, and its problems on the shop floor
Our proposition has been supported by the results o f a sociological 
survey carried out in an engineering factory in Western Hungary. The 
firm to be discussed plays an im portant role in the economic progress 
o f the country. It m anufactures railway cars, tank wagons, various axles 
for trucks and buses — mostly for export. It has also just started the 
production o f heavy-duty diesel engines under licence from a leading
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West German firm. In its different units the enterprise employs a total 
o f about 15,000 physical workers.
The unit at which our sociological survey took place manufactures 
bodies for railway cars. Its employees, about two hundred locksmiths 
and welders, work in groups according to the nature o f their tasks. The 
workgroups are paid directly on the basis o f how much they produce, 
according to  a straight piece-rate system. As the groups’ productivity 
increases, its earnings also increase, and, conversely, as its ou tput falls, 
there is a corresponding drop in wages. Within the group, earnings are 
not divided equally, bu t on the basis o f the personal wage rates o f the 
members. The wage plan thus has the purpose o f functioning as a group 
incentive and as an individual incentive at the same time. The activities 
o f groups are directed by nine foremen and two senior foremen.
The m anagement o f the enterprise was not satisfied with discipline 
and work intensity at the unit, for individual workers and even groups 
often restricted ou tpu t and showed large-scale m obility which endan­
gered the continuity o f production in workshops. This was why the 
managers revised the wage plan (1968). The revision was based on the 
widespread belief that setting proper wage differentials would solve the 
problem.
The wage plan, as a group incentive, seemed to be all right. But as an 
individual incentive it seemed to be unresponsive to  the m anagem ent’s 
efforts geared directly to the quantity o f output. The personal wage 
rates, regulating the relative ratio of individual earnings within the 
group, had been set according to a central service and merit rating 
system. The favorite factors o f the system — the period o f enterprise 
service and the qualification o f professional skill — were irrelevant to 
individual ou tput; namely, neither professional practice nor qualifica­
tion was needed for the highly routine nature o f the work. Thus, per­
sonal wage rates had two major insufficiencies: (1) they did not proper­
ly reflect individual efforts, and they ensured different earnings to 
workers of equal performance; (2) the scale o f individual wage differen­
tials, originating from the rates, did not reflect the possible differences 
in individual ou tpu t because it was too narrow. To correct these in­
adequacies, the management abolished the central service and merit 
rating system and authorized the foremen and the workgroups, since 
they had the most adequate and accurate inform ation about the efforts 
of individuals, to  set new personal wage rates.
The new personal wage rates set by foremen and labor were, how­
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ever, even less responsive to  the m anagem ent’s objectives than the pre­
vious ones. Individual wage inequities continued to exist and the scale 
o f individual wage differentials became even narrower (previous index 
o f differentials: 0.13; new index: 0.10). That is how foremen and 
workers made a step to defeat the purposes o f the wage plan.
In the course o f our survey we examined empirical and logical con­
nections among the level (scale) o f individual wage differentials ap­
proved by the employees, the structure o f interests and powers within 
the organization, and the socioeconomic environment in the back­
ground. Our survey endeavored to  cover all the im portant factors m oti­
vating the behavior o f workers and foremen. The inform ation needed 
came from three sources: (1) structured interviews with each worker in 
the unit with the help o f a substantial questionnaire; (2) unstructured 
interviews with the m ajority o f workers, and with the foremen and the 
representative o f top management; (3) data collected by the bureau­
cracy o f the enterprise.
3. Labor-management structure of interests and powers
The lopg-run economic success o f a business organization requires 
workable cooperation between the tw o major participants in produc­
tion, managers and workers, i.e., the form ation o f enterprise goals ac­
ceptable to both o f them. Cooperation and the working out o f common 
goals can be based only on the solution o f conflict situations produced 
by divergences in the interests o f m anagement and labor, on the exis­
tence o f compromise situation in which the two major participants have 
a relatively good bargain in comparison with their contributions to  the 
success o f organization. Compromise, however, does not develop auto­
matically from conflicts; a certain balance o f power and influence is 
necessary between m anagement and labor to advance the process.
In the case o f the enterprise examined, the cooperation between 
managers and workers was not satisfactory: the employees rejected the 
goals that the employers had prescribed for them. Conflict situations 
seemed to  be lasting and the equilibrium o f opposing powers seemed to 
be upset.
On the assum ption that the structure of divergent interests and 
various powers is profoundly determined by the social and economic 
environment, we have examined several factors that might have had a
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direct or indirect effect on the interests, goals, influence, and behavior 
o f people within the framework o f the organization. Since the enter­
prise belongs to  a centrally planned economy, we have paid special 
attention to  regulations by the central agencies.
The clashes between the interests o f management and labor focused 
on wages and ou tpu t (the two were closely connected in the piece-rate 
system employed).
The management, stim ulated by its considerable share in profits and 
using the prices o f the international m arket as guides, tried to choose a 
profit-maximizing mix in its production possibility set (the plant man­
agers have had remarkable freedom in such decisions since the introduc­
tion o f a decentralized scheme in 1968). It made attem pts to  develop 
new dynamic and profitable branches (the production o f heavy-duty 
diesel engines, etc.), as traditional branches, including the manufac­
turing of railway cars, proved to  be unprofitable and subsidies were to 
be cut off by the central agencies. Railway cars could not, however, be 
shut down right away, and that is why cuts in the production costs 
were necessary. In the workshops there was no possibility for intro­
ducing improvements or innovations in the obsolete technology that 
had been used for decades and thus the management decided to cut 
labor costs, to  decrease wages per unit o f  output.
Labor, as its share in profits was low, was motivated by wages. 
Workers were ready to  make extra efforts for extra pay and aimed their 
activities at maximizing earnings. The employees in the workshops, 
mostly o f agricultural origin, were hard-working people, in whose think­
ing wages were fundam ental in relation to their families’living standards 
and also in measuring their im portance in relation to others in and out 
o f the factory. The workers, consequently, opposed the managers’goal 
directed at “sweating” them simply to  “ fill the enterprise coffers.”
Responsibility for the divergences o f management and labor interests 
cannot, however, be fixed entirely on the profit-sharing system, on the 
high level o f production costs in comparison to prices (owing to a 
backward technology), and on the cutting of governmental subsidies 
and on other economic factors m entioned. In the lasting confrontation 
a prom inent part was played by the control o f central agencies over the 
level of wages. The central regulations practically pegged per capita 
wages on a roughly equal level in all engineering enterprises owned by 
the state. Any noticeable increase had to  be covered from the share of 
profits to  be divided among the participants in production. The share
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was considerable in relation to the am ount o f the salaries of managers 
but infinitely small in relation to the total am ount o f wages of em­
ployees.
Thus the management made attem pts to  cut wages per unit o f ou tput 
and, at the same time, to keep per capita wages unchanged: they re­
quired extra efforts from the employees w ithout being willing, or in 
fact being able, t<b give them  extra reward. 1
Only on the basis o f the conditions o f the enterprise and o f the 
specified rules the m anagement was obliged to  follow can we under­
stand the contradictory features o f its incentive policies. The manage­
m ent pressed the workgroups for increased production, and to  this end 
it employed an efficient group incentive, the piece-rate system, without 
— at least theoretically — any ceiling on earnings. It promised extra 
reward for extra output. Moreover, as we have said, the management 
made attem pts also to  improve individual incentives by revising its ser­
vice and merit rating system. But when workgroup productivity and 
wages rose appreciably it arbitrarily reset piece rates, cutting also wages 
per capita and pegging them in one year’s average to  the level perm itted 
by the central agencies. Piece rates were being continually cut. In 1969 
whey were cut twice, and that m eant a tw enty percent loss for labor in 
wages. 2 |
Labor-management conflicts on the level o f wages were o f utm ost 
gravity, as wages held a top place in each worker’s evaluation o f his job. 
They often told us: “We do not come here to  produce railway cars, but 
to earn a living.” The reasons for the money-centered attitude o f labor 
could be found partly in the present level o f living standards in the
1 The control of central agencies over wages supposedly was aimed at avoiding certain 
undesirable effects of the economic reform. The total freedom of managers motivated by their 
share in profits might have rapidly led to growing wages for a part of the workers and to 
unemployment for others, and/or to a high rate of inflation and to the disequilibrium of supply 
and demand in the market of consuming goods. Such a process would have been followed by 
sharp and open social conflicts instead of the concealed ones described in this paper.
2
The regulations of the central agencies do not necessarily call into existence such manage­
ment policies. In several engineering enterprises the poor standards, the poor scheduling of jobs, 
and the insufficiencies in the supply of material and in the maintenance of tools automatically 
prevent management from building up workable incentive systems. Management in other firms, 
enjoying vast subsidies and favorable internal market conditions set by the central agencies, 
naturally refrain from pushing workers to increased efforts. In all these cases a tacit agreement 
is forced by management on labor: it does not offer extra pay, but it does not require extra 
work either.
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Table 1
Workers' evaluation of work.
The extent o f possibilities offered by work for
Learning 
new things
Using one’s 
own ideas
Doing
interesting
tasks
Making profit of 
one’s professional 
knowledge
The actual 
situation 1.40 1.70 1.58 1.95
The expected 
situation 2.50 2.39 2.90 2.74
Gap -1 .10 -0 .69 -1 .32 -0 .79
N ote : The indices above represent the averages of evaluations given by about two hundred 
workers. Mark 3 means a large possibility, while mark 1 no possibility at all.
country and partly in certain aspects o f the environm ent that hindered 
the satisfaction o f higher-level needs o f individuals within the factory. 
Working people were frustrated by the m onotony o f the routine job, by 
their inability to  advance in professional knowledge, by the pressures to 
which they were subject as they tried to  do work o f quality instead of 
quantity , and by their inability to achieve a measure of respect and 
autonom y in their everyday activities.
The workers had practically no change o f prom otion to  the positions
Table 2
Workers’ evaluation of promotion.
The role played by the promotion factors of
Individual
perform­
ance
Enterprise
service
Profes­
sional
knowledge
Approval 
by fellow 
workers
Friends in 
top man­
agement
Social
(trade union 
and party) 
functions
The actual 
situation 1.88 2.01 2.13 1.39 2.11 2.13
The expected 
situation 2.34 2.28 2.50 2.32 1.07 1.31
Gap -0 .46 -0 .27 -0 .37 -0 .93 +1.04 +0.82
Note: The indices above represent the averages of evaluations given by about two hundred 
workers. Mark 3 means a significant role, while mark 1 means an insignificant one.
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o f foremen and senior foremen, that is, to the posts usually within the 
limits o f workers’career structure. On the one hand, in the unit to be 
shut down the num ber o f such positions was gradually decreasing, and 
on the other hand, prom otion at the enterprise was based on factors 
that mostly were beyond the control o f workers.
For the lack o f satisfaction o f their higher-level needs workers mostly 
sought compensation in money.
The series o f management victories and labor defeats, good bargains 
on the one side and poor bargains on the other, resulted in a lasting 
confrontation, the existence o f which reflected also a lack o f equilib­
rium o f powers, an inequity o f opposing forces at the enterprise. The 
management was wielding an overwhelming power that the trade union, 
designed for the defense o f the interests o f labor, was incapable o f or 
unwilling to  counterbalance. Incentive policies at the enterprise, in­
cluding the continual cuts in piece rates, were approved also by the 
executive o f the trade union. The union, as a heritage o f a previous 
period, united in its ranks all sorts o f members o f the business organiza­
tion, from unskilled workers to  top managers. Several trade-union posi­
tions were occupied by foremen, by middle managers, and even by top 
managers. Its executive had a considerable share in enterprise profits. In 
fact, top union leaders and top enterprise managers, despite occasional 
spectacular discussions between them , seemed to be a m onolithic group 
to the workers. Though labor’s rights o f taking part in enterprise affairs, 
including also decisions about the wage plan and prom otion, were 
ensured, they had no means and no proper platform  to do so. The 
functioning o f the institution o f workers’ direct participation in man­
agement decisions relevant to  their interests proved to  be profoundly 
formal. The dom inant push from labor might have come only through 
the informal organization o f workers, which sometimes had substantial 
powers, rival to  those o f management, bu t which in most cases was 
rather weak.
4. Intramanagement and intralabor structure o f interests and powers
It has been suggested that the basic conflict is between management 
and labor and that it arises from certain micro- and macroeconomic and 
social factors created by the present regulations o f the central agencies 
and by the realities o f the socioeconomic progress o f past decades. On
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the assumption, however, that people generally act under the influence 
o f their environm ent, it seems obvious tha t neither enterprise managers 
nor factory workers are a homogeneous social unit, that both are di­
vided into several strata representing also divergent interests and goals. 
Thus, the next step o f our exam ination was to  take under scrutiny the 
intramanagem ent and intralabor structure o f interests and powers, 
which also modifies the course o f overall enterprise clashes.
Within management, the foremen and other low-level supervisors 
formed a separate stratum  with objectives often contradicting the inter­
ests o f top managers. These “ men in the m iddle” had substantial powers 
to  influence the production and wages o f workgroups. For example, the 
functional departm ents o f the m anagement were incapable o f con­
trolling production problems — including supply o f material and main­
tenance — and their solution was up to  the foremen (this situation 
originated from the primitive level o f technology characteristic o f the 
small factories o f the past). But top managers, believing in the efficien­
cy o f centralization within the enterprise, did not take into considera­
tion the influence o f these people. Accordingly, nothing had been done 
to  ensure their cooperation: foremen received a salary inferior to  that 
o f the best workers, and this state o f affairs practically stagnated re­
gardless o f their special efforts or negligence. As a result, management 
policies were a m atter of indifference to  foremen. They neither pro­
m oted nor hindered the success o f m anagem ent’s attem pts to  encourage 
workgroup and individual output. They restricted their activities to the 
performance o f routine tasks. Their substantial powers mostly remained 
potential and their role in the discussions between top management and 
labor was only o f third-rate importance.
Labor was also divided into separate strata. Each worker considered 
m anagem ent’s incentive policies hostile to his interests and protested 
managem ent’s efforts to  cu t labor costs. Workers devotion to money 
was general. However, personal wage rates, seniority in the organiza­
tion, professional skills, household expenses, structure o f consumption, 
traditions, and other factors produced a similar com partm entalization 
within them  that occured at m anagement level. The two factors respon­
sible for the division o f workers into strata with divergent interests and 
various powers were the following .
(1) One factor was the actual level and the future prospect o f the 
individual’s earnings — in fact, his actual and expected economic posi­
tion in the organization. Both were dependent on wages per capita in
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Table 3
The growth of personal wage rates by years of enterprise service.
Years of enterprise
(professional)
service
Growth related to the total increase of 30 years (%)
Wage rates set by the 
enterprise rating system
New wage rates set 
by foreman and labor
0 -  2 40.0 46.4
2 -  4 8.2 10.0
4 -  6 16.2 7.3
6 -  8 9.7 17.0
8 -1 0 2.8 15.4
10-12 16.7 3.0
12-14 3.8 0.0
14-30 2.6 0.9
100.0 100.0
N ote : 12—14 years of enterprise of professional service is reached by the worker roughly at the 
age of 30.
the workgroup the individual belonged to  and on his personal wage 
rate. As wages per capita were pegged by the enterprise on roughly the 
same level in all the groups, differences in the actual and expected 
economic positions could be caused only by personal wage rates. These 
rates, set primarily on the basis o f enterprise or professional service, 
moved rapidly upward until the individual reached the age o f 30 and 
then definitively stopped. As a result, workers over 30 earned a relative­
ly good living, while their fellowworkers under 30 were making a rather 
bad one. The other side o f the coin: workers over 30 had no prospects 
o f wage increase, and management policies put them in a hopelessly 
deteriorating position, while younger workers enjoyed rapidly growing 
wages and in this way were partly compensated for losses caused by 
piece-rate cuts.
(2) The second factor is the individual’s actual and expected eco­
nomic position out o f the organization (this factor is closely connected 
with the previous one, as the main sources o f the worker’s income are 
his wages). People over 30 usually had a well-balanced household 
budget. They generally had their own family houses, well-furnished and 
mechanized. They had paid debts connected with the building or pur­
chasing o f their homes. They were oriented toward obtaining the avail­
able durable goods, such as television sets, refrigerators, washing ma­
chines, motorcycles, etc. To the wages o f the head o f the family the
earnings o f the wife were also added — she could also have a job  when 
their children reached school age. Workers under 30, on the other hand, 
carried vast burdens o f fundam ental investments connected with the 
establishment o f family life. They were indebted to the savings bank, as 
they turned vast sums o f money to building or getting a house, to 
furnish it etc. Moreover, since their children were small, their wives 
usually could not take a job (in the differences o f the economic posi­
tions o f families, as we have seen, a dom inant role was played by the 
country’s housing shortage, which exerted very strong pressure on 
household budgets for several years in the worker’s life).
On the basis of these two economic factors and some others 
connected with them , workers were divided into two major strata with 
divergent interests and various powers. The age o f 30 seemed to be the 
economic (and not demographic) dividing line.
Workers over 30 vigorously resisted m anagement’s efforts aimed at 
the unconditional m aximization o f workgroup production. Instead, 
they were in favor of the optim ization o f group output. Optim ization 
m eant a tem parary maximization (to  exploit the upward trend of pro­
duction and wages stim ulated by management), followed by a tem po­
rary slowdown (to  avoid the scope o f piecerate cuts, jeopardizing their 
actual positions). Their objective represented a form of rational acc- 
com m odation to the contradictory features o f the m anagement’s incen­
tive policy and was based on the consideration o f the state o f their 
household budget as well. Slowdowns and drops in wages (connected 
with optim ization) were made possible by their flexible needs for 
m oney, by their relatively high earnings within the organization, and by 
the sound economic position o f their families.
Workers under 30, on the other hand, had no alternatives to  choose 
between and acted almost entirely under the economic pressure o f their 
positions. Their needs for money were inflexible as a result o f their 
relatively low individual earnings and the vast expenses o f their house­
hold budgets. They m et the m anagement’s claims to maximize work­
group performance, though reluctantly. They aimed their activities at 
extracting the m ost possible money from the company regardless o f the 
consequences.
The powers o f the tw o strata o f labor, clashing within the framework 
o f the group, were not equal. The older workers (over 30) built up an 
extended informal organization and occupied nearly all formal posi­
tions o f power in many workgroups. The existence o f their informal
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organization, based on the compromise o f  fairly flexible individual in­
terests, originated from the m em bers’ being cornered by management 
and, in a sense, by younger workers as well. People under 30 usually 
had fewer powers and were also at the mercy o f their environment 
within the factory. The pattern of conflicting interests and powers 
within labor, which the managers tried successfully to exploit on the 
principle of divide et impera, had an effect also on the sharpness of the 
overall confrontation between employers and employees. Labor, torn 
by internal clashes, was unable in m ost cases to  build up an efficient 
resistance against management, and that made a considerable contribu­
tion to  the permanence o f chronic disagreement.
5. Various patterns in the behavior o f labor
Workgroups showed significant differences in their behavior con­
cerning performance and personal wage differentials. In accordance 
with our proposition, they also showed corresponding significant dif­
ferences in their patterns of interests and powers. The various charac­
teristics o f workgroup behaviour can be deduced from the conflicting 
and interacting interests and powers o f the two m ajor strata o f workers 
and o f labor and management, and from the socioeconomic environ­
m ent in the background.
We have found three significant types o f workgroup behavior in the 
fields discussed.
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Table 4
Workgroup behavior concerning performance and personal wage differentials.
Types
Number
of
groups
Workgroup behavior
concerning
performance
Level of individual 
differentials approved 
by group
Type I 10 Optimization Medium (index: 0.09)
Type II 5 Maximization High (index: 0.13)
Type III 4 Maximization Very low (index: 0.01)
Workgroups belonging to  the three separate types had different social 
composition: they all were recruited from the two m ajor strata of 
workers, bu t in various ratios.
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Table 5
Socioeconomic background of workgroup membership.
Types
Workers 
above the 
age of 30
Skilled
workers
Workers
with enter- Workers 
prise service having a 
above family 
10 years
Workers
having
their
own home
Average level 
of personal 
wage rates 
in group 
in forints
Related to the whole of membership (%)
Type I 65.1 80.3 53.0 77.7 60.8 8.35
Type II 32.8 78.2 25.2 51.5 32.8 7.85
Type III 84.3 50.5 41.1 73.7 78.9 8.23
Type I. The great m ajority of group members were older workers 
(over 30), while younger people (under 30) were in the m inority. The 
older workers were instrum ental to one another in the following way: 
they joined together, built up a powerful informal organization cover­
ing an average 70 percent o f group membership, and seized all possible 
means o f formal power — occupying the positions o f group leaders and 
trade union functionaries, and also having several Communist Party 
members among them. The informal organization served as an agency 
through which members obtained and evaluated inform ation about 
their environment. It worked out normative rules for collective activity 
in order to control the aspects o f  economic and social environm ent that 
were of consequence to  individual members. It functioned as a defense, 
endeavoring to  pro tect its members and to  extract the most possible for 
them  from their common “ enem y” . It carried out the optim ization of 
workgroup productivity, blocking the deterioration o f the economic 
positions o f workers and keeping their wages, in comparison with their 
efforts, at a maximum. Younger workers (under 30) were isolated in­
dividuals ou t o f the framework of informal organization. They were 
forced, by the substantial powers o f the older people, to  adopt optim i­
zation of output. Though it did not always suit their interests — their 
inflexible and pressing needs for money — they could perceive its ad­
vantages and worked in relatively peaceful coexistence with the others. 
The members o f the informal organization, though a decrease in indi­
vidual wage differences m omentarily contradicted their interests, set 
personal wage-rate differentials on a medium (0.09) instead o f a high 
level. In such a way they made a concession to  the younger workers to
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ensure better cooperation within the workgroup against management. 
Groups in Type I, owing to  their highly-developed and one-centered 
informal organization, were capable o f counterbalancing, to a remark­
able extent, the powers o f management. Sometimes they succesfully 
underm ined m anagement attem pts directed against them ; at other times 
they suffered defeat, but they never capitulated, and that is why they 
usually lived in a peaceful atm osphere in the organization. Some 
groups, owing to  their extraordinary cohesiveness and to their mono­
polistic position in the process o f production, even managed to reach 
very high average wages far beyond the level pegged by the enterprise.
Type II. The membership o f workgroups was formed by a great 
m ajority of younger workers (under 30) and a small m inority of older 
people (over 30); in fact, the composition was opposite to  groups of 
type I. The informal organization was weak and divided into opposing 
units, as both  the older and younger workers created their own in­
formal bonds o f solidarity to  protect their interests. A t the same time, 
the means of formal power were also divided between the two strata: 
both occupied group-leader, trade-union functionary, and Communist 
Party positions. Older workers, however, since they were a small m inor­
ity and since their powers proved to be weak, were forced to  give up 
their original objectives and surrender to  the maximization o f ou tput 
urged by their younger fellow-workers and by the management as well. 
This capitulation resulted in a perm anent deterioration o f their posi­
tions, caused by continual “bloody” piece-rate cuts. Thus confronta­
tion, in a rather sharp form, became lasting within the groups. The 
high-level individual wage differentials (0.13) can be explained on the 
basis o f these intralabor clashes. Workers over 30 were unwilling to 
make a concession to  younger people, as cooperation against the man­
agement was by no means possible. They were fighting, in this case with 
considerable success, to preserve a high level o f personal wage-rate dif­
ferentials, favorable to them.
The workgroups, torn  by internal struggles, could not counterbalance 
the powers o f the management. The older workers, brought to  bay by 
their mates, suffered deeply hurting defeats by continual piece-rate 
cuts, while younger people — though somewhat com pensated by the 
growth o f their personal wage rates — were also hurt.
Type III. The members o f these workgroups belonged to the strata of 
older workers, whose best interests, under the circumstances o f the 
company, required the optim ization o f output. This form o f self­
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defense and deliberate exploitation o f the enterprise was, however, 
made impossible here by certain factors o f physical and economic en­
vironm ent no t m entioned before. The primitive preparatory operations 
in the unit were done by these groups, while the others were engaged in 
the more complicated building o f the railroad car body. The existence 
o f a group incentive in types I and II was justified by the collective 
nature o f work, while in these groups it was introduced to simplify 
administration. The workers, only a few in number, performed their 
tasks separately from each other in the different corners o f the shop, 
and in more shifts. The nature of the work, the lack o f perm anent collec­
tive activities, kept people back from forming strong informal bonds 
among themselves that were essential for the optim ization o f output. 
Furtherm ore, per capita wages, being on a roughly equal level in all the 
o ther groups, were here kept very low by the management, also as a 
result o f the primitive individual tasks. Under the pressure of these 
circumstances, the only choice for groups was the maximization of 
productivity: people were forced to  make increasing contribution to 
enterprise objectives for nearly the same am ount o f money. As a primi­
tive form o f defense they decreased differences in personal wage rates 
to  a minimum (0.01). However, their defenselessness reached a high 
level and their opposition to  management was intensive.
The various types o f workgroup behavior in the field o f performance 
and setting wage differentials have been thus deduced from the struc­
ture of interests and powers within the workgroup (intralabor relations) 
and within the company (labor-management relations), based on the 
whole o f the socioeconomic environment. The various types of work­
group behavior gave different results: some workgroups managed to 
reach exceptionally high wages beyond any limits set by the enterprise 
or by the central agencies, while the wages o f others were very low. 
Some workgroups carried out their activities at a comfortable pace, 
while others came under the pressure of tight piece rates.
To put together the results o f workgroup behavior and the facts 
about intralabor and labor-management relations, let us look at table 6.
6. Conclusions
The experiences o f the sociological survey seem to support the 
proposition put forward convincingly: difficulties on the shop floor,
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Table 6
Level of wages and piece rates in workgroups; intralabor and labor-management relations in
groups.
Types of groups
Type I Type II Type III
Monthly wages 
per capita high medium low
Level of piece rates loose or normal normal or tight very tight
Intralabor relations:
Structure of interests workable compro­
mise between two 
strata
chronic conflicts 
between two strata
no definite structure
Structure of powers one-centered power­
ful informal organi­
zation
divided weak in­
formal organization
only casual informal 
bonds among mem­
bers
high level of conflicts high level of conflicts
Labor-management
relations:
Structure of interests 
Structure of powers
low level o f conflicts
relative equilibrium 
of powers
permanent disequi­
librium of powers
complete defenseless­
ness of workers
including also the inadequacies o f the incentive system, have their root 
cause in the structure o f divergent interests and various powers within 
the enterprise. The decrease in individual wage differentials carried out 
by labor in opposition to  m anagem ent’s goals, the occasional deliberate 
slowdown of production by a remarkable num ber o f workgroups, and 
the high level o f m anpower m obility all are sym ptom s o f labor-manage­
m ent and intralabor conflict situations, and also those o f disequilibrium 
of powers. In this respect, the indices o f mobility are also w orth men­
tioning. In type I — where tension was relatively low owing to  the 
considerable powers o f workers — only 21 percent o f members left the 
enterprise during one-and-a-half years. In types II and III — where 
confrontation was especially sharp owing to  the defenseless situation of 
certain strata — about 60 percent o f workers gave notice to  the firm in 
the same period.
The features o f the structure o f powers played an especially impor­
tan t role. The lack o f proper division o f the means o f power among the
L. Hethy, C. Mak6, Obstacles to the introduction o f  efficient money incentives 197
participants in production resulted in very grave consequences. We also 
had an impression that no t only was the division o f power imperfect, 
but the whole am ount o f means at the disposal o f the organization was 
insufficient. The company seemed to  be too much tied up by central 
regulations to be capable o f finding more satisfactory solutions for its 
pressing problems. The participation o f labor can scarcely be imagined 
if the m anagement itself does not have enough freedom in vital deci­
sions (for example, about the level o f wages).
As the structure o f interests and powers is basically determined by 
the socioeconomic environm ent, the difficulties in the workshops can 
be overcome only by fundam ental coordinated modifications in the 
complex o f micro- and macrosocioeconomic factors. The prevailing 
belief in Hungarian society tha t problem s vis-a-vis labor can be solved 
by the revision o f incentive plans, by the in troduction o f fair wage 
differentials, th a t is, by the change in a sole m icroeconomic factor, is 
profoundly naive, as proved also by the example o f the enterprise 
examined. The major factors having an influence on the cource of 
occurrences within the factory are the following.
(1) In macro- (th a t is, national) measures the major factor is the 
regulations o f the central agencies o f econom y, such as the profit 
sharing system, the control over wages per capita, the practice o f setting 
prices at the internal m arket and o f giving subsidies for business organi­
zations, the system o f credits for company investments — in one word, 
the state o f the decentralized scheme o f the centrally planned economy 
introduced in 1968. We can enlist here also regulations directly affect­
ing labor: the central measures directed at the welfare o f the population 
(the social insurance system, the housing program), the policy o f taxa­
tion, etc. Rules outlining the construction and functioning o f social 
institutions, such as trade unions, should also be m entioned here. The 
central regulations are based on a scientific analysis o f the economic 
and social realities that have been in existence for the past few decades, 
and include complicated social, hum anitarian, and political preferences. 
T hat is why change, though essential, because o f a num ber o f negative 
side effects, cannot be a rapid process.
(2) In m icro-(enterprise) measures the main factors are the incentive 
policies o f the m anagement (the wage plan o f the workers, the system 
o f personal wage rating, the incentives for forem en and other middle 
managers, the practice o f piece-rate setting, etc.), the aspects o f prom o­
tion, the functioning of trade-union and other social organizations, the
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state of the decentralization o f internal decisions, the construction of 
institutions for labor’s participation, the existence and stability o f in­
formal organization, the social composition and stratification of 
workers, the effects o f their out-of-factory environments and traditions, 
and so on. Though all these microfactors are closely connected with the 
macro ones, certain improvement in the solution o f conflict situations 
can be achieved even by their revision within the limits o f the enterprise 
possibilities, if the modifications are based on careful consideration.
The following step forward, however, requires the contribution of 
the social sciences: much more emphasis should be laid on the defini­
tion o f the main groups o f participants and the conditions under which 
they are motivated to  participate and to  produce, on processes by 
which m ultiple centers o f power and influence develop and on con­
flict resolution as a subject o f im portance not only in labor-manage­
m ent relations but in m ost o ther intergroup relations within the firm as 
well.
